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Comparative analysis should instead generalize, with rigor, about similarities and
differences with respect to common phenomena. This book is, however, a valuable addition to the complex body of
literature on strategy, national security,
and comparative political and military
dynamics.
K. A. BEYOGHLOW

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Mauroni, Albert J. Chemical-Biological Defense:
U.S. Military Policies and Decisions in the Gulf War.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998. 226pp. $59.95

Although we lived with the dangerous
specter of nuclear attack for more than
fifty years during the Cold War, concerns
about the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) have virtually
exploded into our consciousness in the
past decade. Since the demise of the former Soviet Union—once referred to as
our “malefactor partner in the concept of
mutually assured destruction”—our fears
seem to focus far less on the threat of nuclear holocaust, and more on the threat
of attack by chemical or biological
agents. The logical point of departure for
this shift in focus seems to be the Persian
Gulf War, when the world learned of a
rogue nation seemingly bent on proliferating these weapons of mass terror.
In this book, Albert J. Mauroni attempts
a historical recounting of U.S. efforts to
deal with chemical and biological warfare
agents on the modern battlefield. Mauroni,
a former U.S. Army Chemical Corps officer
who currently works as a management
consultant specializing in Department of
Defense chemical and biological defense
programs, provides a detailed look at
what was essentially a “cold start”
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go-to-war effort on behalf of the U.S.
armed forces. The consistent premise
throughout this work is that no one in
the Department of Defense (with the exception of the Army’s Chemical Corps)
was even remotely prepared for an encounter with chemical or biological
agents as it readied for war with Iraq.
Convinced at the onset of Operation
DESERT SHIELD that Saddam Hussein
would indeed use WMD against U.S. and
coalition forces, the Pentagon began
what Mauroni describes as a “mad
scramble” to train and equip U.S. forces
to operate in the presence of WMD
agents. He reviews the preparation to defend against exposure to these agents,
and assesses U.S. efforts to protect its
forces against a highly lethal asymmetrical threat. In addition, Mauroni devotes a
chapter to the issue of “Gulf War illness,”
providing a fairly meticulous and forthright discussion of this controversial subject. He concludes with substantive
recommendations on where the future
focus of U.S. efforts to deal with the burgeoning threat of chemical and biological
agents should lie. At a minimum,
Mauroni’s work at dissecting the policies
and decisions of the Gulf War is important if only as a lesson that the United
States must never again be so fundamentally ill prepared to operate in the asymmetrical environment.
There are criticisms to be made of this
book, however. At the surface level,
Mauroni uses far too many acronyms for
the book to be easily decipherable for the
non-Army (and especially nonmilitary)
reader. Although he includes a list of
abbreviations at the beginning to assist
with the veritable “acronym soup” of abbreviations, it becomes confusing and
tiresome to refer back constantly to a
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glossary to understand what one is
reading.
Additionally, Mauroni’s use of the term
“chemical-biological” can lead one who
is uneducated in the specific characteristics
of chemical and biological agents to believe that there is no readily discernable
difference between the two types of
WMD agents. In reality, there is nothing
farther from the truth. Chemical and biological agents are so different in their
properties and potential effects on the
human physiology that discussions about
countering or mitigating their effects
should remain separate. By consistently
lumping them together, Mauroni gives
the reader the impression that the measures taken for defense and consequence
management against chemical-agent exposure will be essentially the same as
those for coping with a biological threat.
Of greater concern, however, are statements made by the author in the first
chapter. He describes his purpose in
writing the book: “Only if CB weapons
were used on civilians and population
centers would they truly be ‘weapons of
mass destruction.’ On the military battlefield, these weapons, shorn of the ridiculous air of menace given to them by
politicians and the media, are merely another tactical-operational factor like enemy air attacks or unforeseen terrorist
attacks; military forces can and do take
steps to minimize the effects of chemical-biological contamination. If a military
force invests a small amount of time and
funds in planning, defensive equipment
and training, the immediate threat of
mass casualties is avoided, and chemical-biological weapons become merely
‘weapons of mass disruption’ [his italics]
instead of destruction.”
I find these comments both naïve and
dangerously out of touch with the reality
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of WMD agents, and certainly contradictory to U.S. efforts at counter-proliferation
throughout the Department of Defense.
Although we have taken steps to deal
with the possibility of chemical exposures
among our operational forces (which
should be construed as tactical events in
the scope and scale of their effects), calling a biological agent a “weapon of mass
disruption” ignores its potential for strategic impact. The World Health Organization (which currently offers the most
widely accepted casualty estimates for biological agents) predicts that the United
States could incur more than 250,000 casualties in a targeted population of
500,000 from only fifty kilograms of
weaponized anthrax; such an event could
hardly be usefully characterized as a
“disruption.”
There are other places where the reader
may take exception to Mauroni’s statements—most notably, his comment in
chapter 3 that in 1990 the “official U.S.
policy was to reduce the likelihood of enemy chemical weapons use by threatening retaliation with similar munitions.”
The United States never considered the
use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War,
since it had long before decided not to
use chemical weapons as retaliation in
kind. The author’s footnote in chapter 4
regarding the requirement for a company
of bakers to augment a medical unit is
flatly derogatory to the medical professionals who did so much to ensure that
health-protection measures were in place
during the Gulf War. His claim that the
medics were ill trained and ill prepared
to deal with contaminated casualties
since “these practical issues had never
surfaced in the minds of the medical
community” is patently false. Several
hundred volumes published since the
First World War deal with the medical
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handling of chemically contaminated
casualties.
In the end, this work comes off as not
much more than a “hoo ah” for the Army
Chemical Corps, who are billed as having
redeemed the Department of Defense’s
collective ineptitude with respect to
chemical or biological attack. While
Mauroni does offer an accurate overall
accounting of the Army Chemical
Corps’s efforts to deal with the asymmetrical threat of chemical and biological
agents on the battlefield, he gives little
more than a passing nod to the overall efforts of the other services and their collective attempts to counter or mitigate
this omnipresent threat. Readers familiar
with the subject of WMD should be cautioned that there is much with which to
find exception in this work. Readers unfamiliar with the subject should be careful not to conclude that the capabilities
of the Department of Defense are so uniformly one-sided.
PIETRO D. MARGHELLA

Lieutenant Commander
Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy

Khalilzad, Zalmay M., and John P. White, eds.
The Changing Role of Information in Warfare. Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999. 452pp. $25

Is there need for yet another book on the
role of the military in the information
age? To judge by this volume, a collection
of essays published under RAND’s Project
Air Force, the answer is yes—but this may
be twice the book we need. In this case,
more than enough is not necessarily better.
The Changing Role of Information in Warfare is part of RAND’s Strategic Appraisal
series, and it primarily addresses the effects of information technology on
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American military planning and
operations. The fifteen chapters provide
a useful review of the dangers and opportunities that information technology
presents to U.S. military forces. While
originally intended for the Air Force, the
work should interest a wider professional
audience, especially because it includes a
broad spectrum of views, ranging from
techno-optimists to info-war pessimists.
The editors are well regarded authorities:
Zalmay Khalilzad is a former assistant
deputy under secretary of defense for
policy planning, and John White is a former deputy secretary of defense. Many of
the articles were written by well-known
writers on strategy and information warfare, and the foreword is by Andrew W.
Marshall, Director of Net Assessment,
Office of the Secretary of Defense; he is
considered by many to be among the
foremost thinkers in the U.S. government
on future threats and strategies.
However, roughly half the articles cover
ground familiar to anyone who has been
following the discussion in recent years
about the importance of information in
warfare and the dangers of computer
warfare. These chapters might be useful,
for example, to someone looking for a review of the various ways computer hackers can disrupt military operations. But
because so much has been written on this
constantly changing topic, the more technical chapters do not cover much new
territory and are already slightly outdated.
The chapter on information-age terrorism,
for instance, warns that future terrorist
attacks may take the form of “cybotage”
aimed at information infrastructure. This
may be true, although it hardly is a new
idea; moreover, so far in the information
age, old-fashioned terrorism remains dominant, as the attack on the USS Cole reminded us.
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